Formal Power-Sharing and Delegating Arrangements in the Environment of DoDDs, Private, and International Schools

Daniel R. Fruit

Jacqueline Naspo

An educational director has a complex and difficult job. He has to make important decisions that keep a school on a path leading to educational outcomes. Performing his/her duties includes a necessary exercise of power, which Max Weber (1947, p. 171) terms "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance." An educational director clearly needs, among his/her powers, the power to make decisions. Yet, that power doesn’t always solely rest in the hands of the director.

A brief aside must be given to define the contextual meaning for the term "director." This is the common term used for international school directors. In DoDDs, "The Department of Defense Dependent Schools," the closest equivalent is the school principal, and in the case of "New England Academy," the fictitiously-named private school used in this study, the term is "head." Choosing the term "director" avoids the less active connotations of "administrator" as well as preserving the important distinction between "leaders" and "managers" for use later in this paper. So when referring to all three of these categories of school leaders, this paper will employ the term "director."

Educational directors often do not alone possess the power to make important decisions about the running of their school. Sometimes, formal and informal arrangements force a delegation or sharing of power. This paper explores the character of these formal power-sharing and delegating arrangements, using one instrument to gather primary data, the "American International School of...Decision Analysis Chart" in the context of three different environments, the international school, the private school, and the DoDDs school. It will conclude with some description of the skills needed for the director to survive in these three environments and some suggestions for further study.

As many organizational systems writers observe (Meyer 1978), schools are open systems. To at least some degree, they interact with their environment. One important element in that environment is the formally-constituted bodies representing the local community.

In the case of an overseas international school, this body is usually termed "the Board of Directors" or simply "the Board." This body may include the actual owners of the school, important individuals within the community, parents, embassy officials, and important local persons (Broman 1996). International school boards face two unusual conditions. First they work in a multi-national environment in which exists considerable ambiguity as to how "American" their schools should be (Broman 1996) and endure frequent turn-overs of membership (Brown 1996).

Private schools, typically, have somewhat similar boards. Private school boards refer to members to "trustees." The boards of NAIS (National Association of Independent Schools) schools have between ten and twenty-five members. The NEA school board meets the definition of a "governing board" one of four categories into which Carver (1990) divides private school boards. In the case of a governing board, to follow Carver, key decisions rest in the board’s hands. NEA’s board, as is typical of private school boards (Stanton 1989), includes alumni, parents of former students, corporate leaders, and wealthy benefactors.

In the cases of both NEA and the international schools, board members usually hold a financial stake in the success of the school, whether through tuition or stewardship of institutional funds, and represent this funding as well as the local people. This arrangement parallels that of the board of directors of a company or, of course, American school boards, which also represents local constituencies and their dollars.

The DoDDs schools represent something of a special case in any discussion of American schools but particularly in terms of the external environment. The U.S. government, instead of any local community, pays for these schools. They boast no local school boards, though they fall subject to the oversight of a number of governmental agencies (Fruit, 1992). As a result, the closest DoDDs equivalent to the international school board, the "SAC" ("Site-Area Council"), represents the local community in an advisory capacity with only the most distant claim to representing "tax-payer dollars."

This study posits that the locus of decision-making varies considerably in three different settings: the international school, the private school, and the DoDDs high school. If, indeed, the "buck" stops in different places in these different settings, this suggests that those chosen for these positions need to possess a different set of skills. To put this another way, an individual suited to direct an international school might flounder at a DoDDs school or a private school and the reverse.

Having established this open system framework, this study will next turn to characterize the types of relations that might effect a school through its connection with the external environment.

A number of writers on the subject of power and organizations differentiate between formal and informal power arrangements. This paper will not explore the subject of informal power arrangements, which include Weber’s (1947, p. 171) "charismatic authority and traditional authority," Blau and Scott’s (1962) "informal authority," and what Etzioni (1975) terms "normative power," except to suggest an often close relationship between informal and formal power arrangements. In the relatively self-defined environment of an international school, for example, an informal power sharing arrangement may well become formalized. This study of formal power-sharing arrangements, then, might also reveal where less formal power lies, nevertheless, this paper will concentrate on formal arrangements of power.

According to Mintzberg (1983), the forces and actions of the external environment effect the internal environment of the school. In fact, he proposes that the type and nature of these external forces can actually determine the internal environment of the school. This idea forms a reasonable point of departure for the study of the schools considered in this study. To follow Mintzberg, the forces he terms "coalitions" effect the cultures of their schools in the manner listed below:

Note that in Mintzberg’s schema external forces dominate the school in two out of the three cases. Only in the third case, the passive external coalition, does the school develop its own dominant, internal coalition and a self-defined school culture.

It’s important, then, to see that two related questions determine where power rests in an institution and the kind of culture that might develop in response. First, and this is not a question that Mintzberg himself suggests, one must determine the strength of the external environmental forces. A very united external coalition that, by law or statute, can address very few matters cannot effect a school very much, whatever its intentions. Such a group functions much like a group of disgruntled shareholders armed with only non-voting stock; grumble though they might, little might they effect.

Second, one must determine the nature of those external forces. Should they be either dominated or divided, they will have some measure of influence on the internal environment of the school. In the case of a divided external coalition school, they stand the risk of dividing the school in their image. If, however, the external coalition remains passive, then the internal coalition’s influence becomes the more important. According to Mintzberg, the question, in this passive external environment, becomes whether the internal culture of the school marches behind one person, follows a bureaucratic set or rules, creates a sense of professionalism, or adheres to a particular ideology.

Having established a framework for examining formal mechanisms for sharing power, next we turn to our instrument for this study.

This study relies primarily upon a single instrument, the "American International School of...Decision Analysis Chart." This chart lists 38 decisions commonly faced by an international school. For each question, respondents can check only one of four possible answers that show where the final authority for that decision rests. Choices consist of the following:

* "Must" was also interpreted as "should." In either case, this suggests some degree of responsibility to the board.

This survey yields two types of data. First, it shows the relative strength of the school leader versus that of the school board, or, in the case of DoDDs, the SACs. Those issues on which the Director’s authority merits a "4," for example, indicate a greater amount of power, on his part, than a "3."

This data also produces a rough profile of the power delegated to non-professional interest-holders by the school. Here, the percentage of decisions falling into each category produces the relevant material. The higher the percentage of 1s and 2s, the more areas fall, at least nominally, under the shared authority of the board or SAC.

A Boston University course on School Organization and Policy administered this instrument on July 24, 1996 to a group of 16 doctoral students. The class membership consisted of leaders at international schools, including directors, principals, teachers, and counselors, who responded concerning their own current or most recent school. Student results were averaged to come up with the second type of data. It’s important to note that, in many cases, class members responses did not denote a formal "rule" but usual practice, showing again, the mix of formal and informal. The data here, however, does give a general picture of the amount of power-sharing between community stake-holders and school directors.

In order to contrast this, Jacqueline Naspo filled out the same questionnaire for New England Academy, a private, independent school in the Boston area. At NEA, students pay tuition in order to attend. In general these answers represent a combination of two different kinds of procedures. First the NAIS Trustee Handbook (Stanton 1989) gives clear delineation of a head and boards responsibilities in some areas. For others, NEA schools develop their own operating procedures.

For the DoDDs perspective, Daniel Fruit filled in the information for Yokota High School, a typical DoDDs high school located in Japan, near Tokyo. Unlike the international schools, DoDDs employs comparatively well-detailed procedures regarding the kinds of decisions in this study. The answers given show, with slight variation, where decisions are made at all DoDDs school and not just Yokota High School.

Before studying the data, the authors made two hypotheses. First, we hypothesized that NEA’s head shares or delegates less power than does the international school director. This was hypothesized because of external observation and also because of the higher level of stability of the NEA board compared to that of international school.

We further hypothesized that the DoDDs principal shared less and enjoyed less power than international school colleagues. We hypothesized this for two reasons. First, DoDD’s SACs, the closest equivalent to the international school boards merely advise and make few decisions of any importance. Second, DoDDs clearly defines the decisions which DoDDs principal make, but the principals themselves make relatively few decisions. Often, administrators higher up in the DoDDs hierarchy, rather than either the principal or SAC, hold the power to make the kinds of decisions listed in the survey.

The methodology employed, necessarily, imposes some limitations on the predictive power of the conclusions. First, obviously, the small class size might not fairly constitute a very representative sample of international schools. Class members only work at about 5% of all international schools. In the case of NEA, it might be argued that it doesn’t represent a typical, private school. In the case of DoDDs, as mentioned previously, procedures do sometimes vary slightly between one school and another.

Second, the graphs and averages used may present more of a snapshot of decision-making than a description of what actually occurred. Just because a given person holds apparent authority to make a decision doesn’t necessarily mean that he will, or that he can, ignore informal pressures. Should a board, for example, delegate full hiring and firing power to its director, as a question, doesn’t mean that he can ignore the board’s wishes to retain a popular teacher whose performance the director considers unsatisfactory.

A third problem involves the participants themselves. On some questions, member responses varied considerably. This reflects, in part, the diverse nature of international schools, but it leads to some questions, again, to what extent results might be regarded as typical. Given this methodology, we turn to the results.

Even a cursory glance at the data shows two differing patterns that differentiate the DoDDs schools and the private, independent school from the general pattern of international schools. As predicted, the different types of school yield different data (to view all of the questions, refer to Appendix One; for a graphical view of the same data, refer to Appendix Two).

Averaging the 38 different measures together yields the following measure of director autonomy in decision-making:

Director Autonomy In Decision-Making

(rounded to two decimals)

Looking at the second question, however, alters this picture somewhat. The following table shows the percentage of decisions that can be made without deferring to the SAC or board:

Director Immunity From Board or SAC in Decision-Making

(rounded to two decimals)

To measure the level of external influence requires making some amendments to the DoDDs figure. With one exception, all of the responses that were listed in category 1 are actually made, not by the SACs, but by those higher-up in a DoDDs hierarchy. To reflect this, the "DoDDs-2" figure does not count these as SAC decisions. The DoDDs principal, therefore, emerges as "least influenced" by his environment but, paradoxically, also the weakest director in terms of his own decision-making autonomy. With external influences the weakest upon the DoDDs principal, the question then becomes, as Mintzberg suggests, what internal forces make the decisions in DoDDs as will be discussed below.

The NEA headmaster, in turn, faces a slightly more influential external environment. About a third of his most important decisions fall prey to external review. On the other hand, he retains the highest amount of autonomy in decision-making (2.84). This means that under most circumstances the influence of the environment will stay relatively weak. The relative power of the head, further, suggests that under most circumstances, an internal coalition, under his leadership, will dominate the school culture, as will be explored in the discussion section regarding NEA.

The international school leader faces a totally different set of circumstances. Of the three types of schools, the international school director must delegate or share decisions with boards the highest percentage of the time (51.80%). Given the power of the board to effect him, the director must face two problems. First, he must get the board to become passive, in order to secure the power to develop an internal coalition. Then, he must develop that internal coalition. The magnitude of this task helps explain the demonstrably short life (Broman 1996) of most directors of international school director as will be discussed below.

Having examined the explicit delegations of power at these three schools, it’s now necessary to look more closely, in turn, at each of these three situations.

To those familiar with the DoDDs schools, to term them "bureaucratic" seems a laughably obvious conclusion. If anything, DoDDs seems, to borrow Saddam Hussein’s phrasing, "the Mother of all bureaucracies." On the other hand, however, Mintzberg’s typology suggests that, in fact, there are four different possible power arrangements within a system that finds itself relatively immune from the effects of the world around it, and they include, again, "professional," "personal," and "ideological," as well as "bureaucratic." A quick analysis, however, will demonstrate that the DoDDs school represents a full-blown bureaucracy.

Any discussion of bureaucracy typically follows Max Weber’s (1947, pp. 47-59) classic definition of a bureaucracy. Weber identifies five key characteristics of a bureaucratic organization:

A couple of pieces of information from the previous study can provide some insight into the internal, bureaucratic, orientation of DoDDs. Looking at the previous study, this author tried to identify who made the decisions listed in the study. A summary below (for the entire chart refer to Appendix Three) presents ample evidence of 1)division of labor and a (3)hierarchy of authority:

Total = 53

The fact that so many decisions take place, not at the local school, but in Washington or at the regional level, often hours of flying time away, provides evidence also of Weber’s (2)impersonality. The number of decisions involving the DoDDs Personnel Office, further, suggests Weber’s(5) career orientation.

One last piece of data yielded by this survey helps indicate the high amount of (4)rules and regulation present in DoDDs. In the introduction of the survey, instructions indicate that individuals may designate which decisions fall into the category of "policy." Only one group of five students completed this section of the survey (N=5). The amount of issues that fall into the area of policy as defined by the international schools forms an interesting contrast with the DoDDs school and shows the level of regulation that engulfs the DoDDs school:

International School 20% (N = 5)

This may seem a relatively arbitrary measure of the amount of regulation, but consider just a sampling of the morass of rules and regulations that guide the life of a DoDDs school. Here is just a sampling from just a single binder from the six-foot shelf of regulations that guide Yokota High School (Note that these references may be dated; regulations are regularly updated, the new regulation replacing the old). There are regulations for:

length of the day (DS 20002.2, 1982)

high school graduation (DSPAR 2000.1, 1984)

parent conferences (DS 2000.3, 1981)

curriculum development (DS 2000.5, 1978)

sequential learning program for all grades in all subjects (DSPAR 2000.9, 1987),

pupil assessment (DS 2000.6, 1985)

homework (DS 2000.8, 1990)

accreditation (DS 2010.1, 1987)

authorized textbooks(DS 2400.1, 1977)

extracurricular activities (DSPAR 2003.1, 1990)

topics of a sensitive or controversial nature (DSPAR 2000.7, 1980)

Nor do the regulations end with internal regulations. DoDDs also falls under the oversight of various occasional reviews by congressional committees (summarized in Walling 1985 and Bartell and LeBlanc, 1983). For a more thorough discussion, refer to Fruit’s (1992) excellent paper on the social environment of a DoDDs school.

This mass of regulation precludes the possibility that DoDDs might fall under the domination of either an individual, an ideology, or a professional body. For an individual, such as a principal, only so much room remains for personal decisions in an environment so clearly defined. The same holds true for an ideological faction. Moreover regulations specifically prohibit just those sorts of activities (DoDDs Civilian Handbook, 1996). A slightly stronger case might be made for a "professional" orientation, but OEA, the Federal union, effectively divides the school’s professionals into administrators and teachers. Various statutes, also, prohibit the OEA from striking or bargaining on any matters not specifically granted to it by the Federal government. So again, a single, professional culture cannot develop. With the influence of individuals, professional organizations, and ideological groups prohibited, the DoDDs school clearly represents a bureaucratic organization.

If the DoDDs school represents a bureaucracy, then the effective principal needs to be a bureaucrat. It’s important to make a distinction, hinted before, that a number of authors, including Nadler and Tushman (1990) make between the qualities necessary for a leader versus that of a manager. We present these below, however, presenting not as two distinct categories, but as two opposite poles:

DoDDs

Leaders Managers principal

The DoDDs school principal clearly sits at the managerial end of this scale. The DoDDs principal exists in a well-defined environment, guided by rules. Mistakes, when they occur, often consist in not following the rule or regulation, not in overcoming opposition or external obstacles. This helps explain the fact that of over one hundred articles listed in ERIC for the last fifteen years regarding DoDDs, not a single one concerns decision-making. In fact, only a single document (Steimal 1992) considers aspects of the principal’s performance and that an unpublished dissertation.

If the DoDDs principal must function as bureaucrat, then a number of behaviors will encourage survival. First, he/she must know the rules and how to use them. Accordingly, a good deal of DoDDs principal preparation consists in doing exactly this. Second, he must learn to work within hierarchical relationships. In other words, he needs to learn to work with designated inferiors and superiors. Third, he needs to learn to innovate within a constrained environment. "Innovation," in this context often means learning how to creatively accomplish goals and objectives set by others. Fourth, he must, to a certain extent, adopt the goals of the greater organization as his own. If he does this, he must aspire to inspire those beneath him to the greater efforts that will result in promotion up the hierarchy. In short, the DoDDs principal, to succeed, needs to become the classic "company man."

Having looked at the situation of DoDDs, this paper, next, turns to the situation of the private school.

The NEA head faces a different set of circumstances than the DoDDs principal. As noted previously, the external environment exerts more influence on the NEA headmaster. Comparing the private school to the DoDDs schools, the headmaster has to share more decisions with the board. An independent school board, according to Stanton (1989), has four principle responsibilities:

"organizes and manages itself so as to fulfill its duties; plans, develops and establishes policy, and assesses performance of the school; is responsible for the school’s financial condition and its physical plant; and selects the head and works cooperatively with that person."

The head of a private school exhibits the characteristics of a leader, rather than a manager, even as he is still somewhat effected by external forces:

Leaders NEA head Managers

The power of the board, however, is effectively limited in a number of ways. First, the board only meets three times a year. Much of the board’s work is done in standing committees, effectively dividing its influence. The NAIS handbook (Stanton 1989) even goes so far as to recommend that board candidates be screened out who show an unwillingness to work on these committees. In general, then, it would take a seriously dissatisfied board to "seize control" of the climate of a private school.

This leads us to the question of the internal coalition. In the relatively regulation-free environment of a private school, without a hierarchy, a DoDDs-style bureaucracy cannot develop. This leaves the possibilities of "ideological," "personalized," or "professional" internal coalition, Mintzberg’s other three choices. In the case of the private school, with so much decision-making power concentrated in the head, the type of environment will depend largely on the person in charge.

In the case of NEA, the school mixes characteristics of all three. Clearly, its master sets the tone with his long-term relationships with board members, thirteen year tenure, and style, clearly make this school seem a "personalized" environment. Yet, he performs a large amount of his decision-making with the faculty and board in committee, making it seem to have more of a "professional" internal coalition. For example, NEA works through the following standing committees:

executive

membership

budget

finance/investment

external affairs

education

diversity

personnel policy

building and grounds

ad hoc planning (NEA 1996).

On the other hand, the head promulgates an educational philosophy that permeates the institution. Reasonably, then, NEA might be described as a personalized, ideological, professional internal coalition environment. Clearly, however, unlike DoDDs, the head dominates the school.

A head for a private school, such as NEA, must be a leader. He must hold a vision that will guide a school in a direction that comes not from a book or regulations or orders from above. He must energize those around him to work towards that vision. He must enable his school to continue.

Of our three directors, the international school director emerges as probably the weakest. Over half his decision fall prey to overrule or oversight by his board. The board membership, moreover, turns over rapidly and unpredictably. In order to have to any influence over the culture of his school, he needs first to deal with his board in order to achieve Mintzberg’s "passive external coalition."

A number of methods have been suggested for doing this. Herman and Heimovics (1990) suggest three possible alternatives:

(1) they may accept the hierarchical structure and see themselves as subordinates to the board;

(2) they may develop a cynical, manipulative approach, active as board were in charge, but structuring processes so that the board becomes merely their rubber stamp;

(3) they may realize that they get more done for the organization and its mission if they take responsibility for the board’s working effectively and so work proactively with the trustees.

Looking at these three possibilities, in turn, the first suggests a basically bureaucratic organizational structure and relationship when one does not exist. Further, it ignores that fact that half the decisions listed above remain in the hands of the director, and then, for the remainder, certainly the director should have some voice, if only as an advisor. The first alternative, then, seems questionable.

The second possibility is, essentially, a political way of controlling the school. Whatever its moral shortcomings, it might prove effective, but, in the end, would likely fail as well as it relies on manipulation which often backfires. The frequent turn-over of board membership, further, would require a really politically masterful performance in order for a director to continue to fool "most of the people most of the time."

The third alternative, then, remains the best choice. It reflects, as the responses above show, the true division of decision-making power. It also allows the director to use what French and Raven (1968) term "expert power" in a productive way in order to ensure the educational well-being of the school. The international school head, then, with his board to satisfy, clearly must reside at the leadership end of the scale shown below:

International School Director

/

/ Leaders Managers

Given then this unique environment, with strong external forces that can come dominate the school, the international school director must be a strong leader. He must display a vision of where he means to lead the school and effectively enlist the support of not only his school but also the board with whom he shares so much of his power. His energizing, further, must reach the board as well as the faculty.

He must enable his school to prosper, while working hand in hand with a board that changes and often lacks focus.

This study then yields several conclusions. First, the Mintzberg typology of coalitions, with the amendments added above, can provide insight into the environments of various types of schools. The DoDDs school, with its insulation from the external environment, clearly functions as a bureaucracy. The private school, while somewhat more influenced by its external environment, due to the stronger position of its head, can develop any of the types of internal coalitions that Mintzberg describes. The international school, the most susceptible to the forces of its external environment, may only develop an internal culture when it takes steps to guarantee the passivity, or to phrase more correctly the enlightened cooperation, of those external forces.

Second, this study shows that the kind of person required to direct these varying institutions clearly differs. In the DoDDs environment, a manager is required; a strong, individualistic leader would feel frustration and dissatisfaction. In a private school, clearly a person with a strong and clear vision is called for. In the international school, the director needs a combination of leadership skills and the ability to work with others who share the decision-making.

This work suggests some avenues for further study. First, while this study deals with formal delegations and sharing of power, informal power sharing and delegations need assessment. In other words, this study does not consider "politics." To do this would, obviously require objective observation.

Second, this suggests that, within the study of formal power sharing arrangements, a more accurate means of assessment might be designed. The DoDDs school responses, for example, fit largely into a non-existent "other" category. Further, the same survey might be administered to a wider group of subjects, increasing representation.

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Percentage of Decisions That Can Be Made Immune From SAC or Board