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The American National Anthem

The Star Spangled Banner

Oh, say! can you see by the dawn's early light
What so proudly we hailed at the twilight's last gleaming;
Whose broad stripes and bright stars, through the perilous fight,
O'er the ramparts we watched were so gallantly streaming?
And the rocket's red glare, the bombs bursting in air,
Gave proof through the night that our flag was still there:
Oh, say! does that star-spangled banner yet wave
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave?

On the shore, dimly seen through the mists of the deep,
Where the foe's haughty host in dread silence reposes,
What is that which the breeze, o'er the towering steep,
As it fitfully blows, half conceals, half discloses?
Now it catches the gleam of the morning's first beam,
In fully glory reflected now shines in the stream:
'Tis the star-spangled banner! Oh, long may it wave
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave!

And where is that band who so vauntingly swore
That the havoc of war and the battle's confusion
A home and a country should leave us no more?
Their blood has washed out their foul footsteps' pollution!
No refuge could save the hireling and slave
From the terror of flight or the gloom of the grave:
And the star-spangled banner in triumph doth wave
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave.

Oh, thus be it ever, when freemen shall stand
Between their loved home and the war's desolation!
Blest with victory and peace, may the heav'n-rescued land
Praise the Power that hath made and preserved us a nation!
Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just,
And this be our motto: "In God is our trust":
And the star-spangled banner in triumph shall wave
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave.

The United States of America


The United States Presentation



In April 1991, the UN Security Council enacted Resolution 687 requiring Iraq to declare, destroy, or render harmless its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal and production infrastructure under UN or International Atomic Energy Agency supervision. UN Security Council Resolution 687 also demanded that Iraq forgo the future development or acquisition of WMD.

Baghdad's determination to hold onto a sizeable remnant of its WMD arsenal, agents, equipment, and expertise has led to years of dissembling and obstruction of UN inspections. Elite Iraqi security services held an extensive concealment campaign to hide incriminating documents and material that had any relevance towards the resolution of key issues pertaining to its WMD programs.

Successive Iraqi declarations on Baghdad's pre-Gulf war WMD programs gradually became more accurate between 1991 and 1998, but only because of sustained pressure from UN sanctions, Coalition military force, and vigorous and robust inspections facilitated by information from cooperative countries.

Nevertheless, Iraq never has fully accounted for its gaps in its declarations and has provided no credible and reasonable proof that it has completely destroyed its weapons, and building facilities as ordered by the UN. Iraq has preserved and in some cases enhanced the infrastructure and expertise necessary for WMD production and has used that capability to maintain a large masses of WMD and to increase its size and sophistication in some places, and an example is Baghdad.

As you can probably predict by now, Iraq is not only defying the UN, but is also lacking any cooperation methods in order to make any gradual and substantial change any better towards itself. Iraq has defied UN resolutions such as resolutions 687, 707, and 715, all of which comply towards the WMD case.

In this case, we intend to prove, and show you that Iraq is defying these laws, and is a major threat to all countries around it. We also intend to prove to you that Iraq, is helping house, and equip terrorists groups ranging from Nigerian rebels, all the way to the Al-Qaeda network.



Res. 687 (3 April 1991) Requires Iraq to declare, destroy, remove, or render harmless under UN or IAEA supervision and not to use, develop, construct, or acquire all chemical and biological weapons, all ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 km, and all nuclear weapons-usable material, including related material, equipment, and facilities. The resolution also formed the Special Commission and authorized the IAEA to carry out immediate on-site inspections of WMD-related facilities based on Iraq's declarations and UNSCOM's designation of any additional locations. Baghdad refused to declare all parts of each WMD program, submitted several declarations as part of its aggressive efforts to deny and deceive inspectors, and ensured that certain elements of the program would remain concealed. The prohibition against developing delivery platforms with ranges greater than 150 km allowed Baghdad to research and develop shorter-range systems with applications for longer-range systems and did not affect Iraqi efforts to convert full-size aircraft into unmanned aerial vehicles as potential WMD delivery systems with ranges far beyond 150 km.

Res. 707 (15 August 1991) Requires Iraq to allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate and unrestricted access to any site they wish to inspect. Demands Iraq provide full, final, and complete disclosure of all aspects of its WMD programs; cease immediately any attempt to conceal, move, or destroy WMD-related material or equipment; allow UNSCOM and IAEA teams to use fixed-wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq; and respond fully, completely, and promptly to any Special Commission questions or requests.Baghdad in 1996 negotiated with UNSCOM Executive Chairman Ekeus modalities that it used to delay inspections, to restrict to four the number of inspectors allowed into any site Baghdad declared as "sensitive," and to prohibit them altogether from sites regarded as sovereign. These modalities gave Iraq leverage over individual inspections. Iraq eventually allowed larger numbers of inspectors into such sites but only after lengthy negotiations at each site.

Res. 715 (11 October 1991) Requires Iraq to submit to UNSCOM and IAEA long-term monitoring of Iraqi WMD programs; approved detailed plans called for in UNSCRs 687 and 707 for long-term monitoring. Iraq generally accommodated UN monitors at declared sites but occasionally obstructed access and manipulated monitoring cameras. UNSCOM and IAEA monitoring of Iraq's WMD programs does not have a specified end date under current UN resolutions. TABLE FROM CIA-October 2002




PART I: Prove that Iraq is capable of using/making weapons of mass destruction:

· They never denied making them in the first place (stipulations):

· They never denied using them against Iran (stipulations):


There have been reports of chemical warfare from the Gulf War since the early months of Iraq s invasion of Iran. In November 1980, Tehran Radio was broadcasting allegations of Iraqi chemical bombing at Susangerd. Three and a quarter years later, by which time the outside world was listening more seriously to such charges, the Iranian Foreign Minister told the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that there had been at least 49 instances of Iraqi chemical-warfare attack in 40 border regions, and that the documented dead totalled 109 people, with hundreds more wounded. He made this statement on 16 February 1984, the day on which Iran launched a major offensive on the central front, and one week before the start of offensives and counter-offensives further south, in the border marshlands to the immediate north of Basra where, at Majnoon Islands, Iraq has vast untapped oil reserves. According to official Iranian statements during the 31 days following the Foreign Minister's allegation, Iraq used chemical weapons on at least 14 further occasions, adding more than 2200 to the total number of people wounded by poison gas.



One of the chemical-warfare instances reported by Iran, at Hoor-ul-Huzwaizeh on 13 March 1984, has since been conclusively verified by an international team of specialists dispatched to Iran by the United Nations Secretary General. The evidence adduced in the report by the UN team lends substantial credence to Iranian allegations of Iraqi chemical warfare on at least six other occasions during the period from 26 February to 17 March.

The efficiency and dispatch with which this UN verification operation was mounted stand greatly to the credit of the Secretary General. His hand had presumably been strengthened by the announcement on 7 March by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that 160 cases of wounded combatants visited in Tehran hospitals by an ICRC team "presented a clinical picture whose nature leads to the presumption of the recent use of substances prohibited by international law". The casualties visited were reportedly all victims of an incident on 27 February. The ICRC statement came two days after the US State Department had announced that "the US Government has concluded that the available evidence indicates that Iraq has used lethal chemical weapons". Iraq had denounced the Washington statement as "political hypocrisy", "full of lies", a fabrication by the CIA, and had suggested that the hospital patients examined by the ICRC had "sustained the effects of these substances in places other than the war front". On 17 March, at almost the same moment as the UN team was acquiring its most damning evidence, the general commanding the Iraqi Third Corps, then counter-attacking in the battle for the Majnoon Islands, spoke as follows to foreign reporters: "We have not used chemical weapons so far and I swear by God's Word I have not seen any such weapons. But if I had to finish off the enemy, and if I am allowed to use them, I will not hesitate to do so".

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI FACT SHEET Chemical Weapons I May 1984 Authors: Julian Perry Robinson and Jozef Goldblat


EVIDENCE 2: (the following is the documented use of WMD by Iraq)

Documented Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons


Area Used

Type of Agent

Approximate Casualties

Target Population

Aug 1983

Hajj Umran


fewer than 100 


Oct-Nov 1983





Feb-Mar 1984

Majnoon Island




Mar 1984



50 to 100


Mar 1985

Hawizah Marsh




Feb 1986



8,000 to 10,000


Dec 1986

Umm ar Rasas




Apr 1987





Oct 1987


Mustard/nerve agents



Mar 1988


Mustard/nerve agents



Iraqi-Acknowledged Open-Air Testing of Biological Weapons




Al Muhammadiyat – Mar 1988

Bacillus subtilis[5]

250-gauge bomb (cap. 65 liters)

Al Muhammadiyat – Mar 1988

Botulinum toxin

250-gauge bomb (cap. 65 liters)

Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989

Bacillus subtilis

122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)

Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989

Botulinum toxin 

122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)

Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989


122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)

Khan Bani Saad – Aug 1988

Bacillus subtilis

aerosol generator – Mi-2 helicopter with modified agricultural spray equipment

Al Muhammadiyat – Dec 1989

Bacillus subtilis

R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)

Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989

Botulinum toxin

R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)

Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989


R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)

Jurf al-Sakr Firing Range – Sep 1989


155mm artillery shell (cap. 3 liters)

Abu Obeydi Airfield – Dec 1990


Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)

Abu Obeydi Airfield – Dec 1990

Water/potassium permanganate

Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)

Abu Obeydi Airfield – Jan 1991


Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)

Abu Obeydi Airfield – Jan 1991

Bacillus subtilis/Glycerine

Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank (cap. 2,200 liters)

Source: CIA-Approved by the Iraqis --not denied--

· Evidence that they are still capable and posses means of making them:


CIA, Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments, July 1990.

During the Persian Gulf War, Iraq made extensive use of its Scud missile force to attack both Israel and Saudi Arabia - a Scud that hit a U.S. barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 28 U.S. servicemen. This paper completed a month prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait noted that "Iraq has the most aggressive and advanced ballistic missile development program in the Arab world" and that it already had two modified versions of the Scud B - the Al Husayn and Al Abbas.

The paper examines the origins, development, and results of the Iraqi missile program - in the form of the Scud B and its variants. It also examines warhead options - including chemical, biological, and nuclear. In addition, it discusses Iraq's missile production infrastructure as well as foreign assistance to the missile program.

Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released under the Freedom of Information Act



Interagency Intelligence Assessment, Implications of Israeli Attack on Iraq, July 1, 1981

On June 7, 1981, in an attempt to prevent Iraqi acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability, Israeli aircraft bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, before it became operational. This assessment, produced by the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, examines Arab reactions to the attack as well as both the immediate and short-term repercussions of the pre-emptive strike.

Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released under the Freedom of Information Act



Dr. Hans Blix, Briefing of the Security Council, February 14, 2003.

In accordance with UN Resolution 1441, UNMOVIC chief Hans Blix delivered a progress on his organizations activities in Iraq, its findings, and Iraqi compliance with the resolution.

Blix noted that "so far UNMOVIC has not found any [weapons of mass destruction], only a small number of chemical munitions which should have been declared and destroyed." However, he also noted that many proscribed programs had not been accounted for, a matter that he characterized as being of "great significance." He specifically mentioned programs for the production of anthrax, VX nerve gas, and long-range missiles. He also noted the status of UNMOVIC investigations of the Al-Samoud and Al-Fatah missiles as well as casting chambers. With regard to Iraqi actions, he reported that Iraq had formed two commissions to search for relevant documents and that the National Monitoring Directorate had provided a list of 83 individuals who could allegedly verify destruction of chemical weapons and expresses his hope that Iraq will draw up a similar of individuals who participated in the destruction of biological warfare items




Iraq has weapons of mass destruction: ex-soldier

IRAQ was armed for "mass destruction", a man claiming to be a former soldier of the Middle East state told GMA-7's "Unang Balita" in an exclusive interview on Tuesday. Khalid Ahmad said he witnessed how soldiers used chemical weapons to kill some 8,000 Iraqis who opposed Saddam Hussein regime in 1987.

He also stated in a later interview that Iraq has the potential, and sources to build both Biological Weapons, and Chemical Weapons alike. He stated that ever since he was in the army, Iraq had tried to build a Nuclear Weapon, but does not know if they have succeeded.

Posted: 12:22 PM (Manila Time) | Feb. 11, 2003 Unang Balita, reporter



Second possible Iraqi mobile lab found

WASHINGTON (AP) -- U.S. forces found another trailer in northern Iraq that appeared to be a mobile biological weapons laboratory, Pentagon officials said today.

The trailer was similar to one seized last month that U.S. officials believe may have been a germ weapons workshop for the Iraqis, two officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity. American troops found the second trailer around the northern city of Mosul Friday night or Saturday morning, one official said. U.S. experts are examining it in Mosul before sending it to the Baghdad airport, where the first trailer is being held, the officials said.

May 12, 2003 CNN No Author Name


PART II: Establish that Iraq are liars, and that they have lied before:

· Establish that have lied on countless occasions:

1. Currently during the Iraq war, Mohammed Saeed Al-Sahaf.
2. How they had held peace talks with Kuwait, one day before invading it.
3. How they lied about not having long-range weapons such as Al-samoud and Al-abbas missiles, found after the war.
4. How they said they never had anthrax, and nerve gas, but as Blix mentioned, they had found some.



Dr. Hans Blix, Briefing of the Security Council, February 14, 2003.

In accordance with UN Resolution 1441, UNMOVIC chief Hans Blix delivered a progress on his organizations activities in Iraq, its findings, and Iraqi compliance with the resolution.

Blix noted that "so far UNMOVIC has not found any [weapons of mass destruction], only a small number of chemical munitions which should have been declared and destroyed." However, he also noted that many proscribed programs had not been accounted for, a matter that he characterized as being of "great significance." He specifically mentioned programs for the production of anthrax, VX nerve gas, and long-range missiles. He also noted the status of UNMOVIC investigations of the Al-Samoud and Al-Fatah missiles as well as casting chambers. With regard to Iraqi actions, he reported that Iraq had formed two commissions to search for relevant documents and that the National Monitoring Directorate had provided a list of 83 individuals who could allegedly verify destruction of chemical weapons and expresses his hope that Iraq will draw up a similar of individuals who participated in the destruction of biological warfare items




PART III: Iraq never co-operated with the UN inspectors:


Since December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow UN inspectors into Iraq as required by the Security Council resolutions. Technical monitoring systems installed by the UN at known and suspected WMD and missile facilities in Iraq no longer operate. Baghdad prohibits Security Council-mandated monitoring overflights of Iraqi facilities by UN aircraft and helicopters.  Similarly, Iraq has curtailed most IAEA inspections since 1998, allowing the IAEA to visit annually only a very small number of sites to safeguard Iraq's stockpile of uranium oxide.

CIA—October 2002



Blix Urges Iraq to cooperate more:

Hans Blix, the chief United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq, urged Baghdad to be more "proactive" in convincing the world it has no weapons of mass destruction if it wants to avoid war. After talks with European Union officials in Brussels today, Blix indicated he believes the UN Security Council will give inspectors more time to continue their work when the council meets on 27 January. Mohammad el-Baradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said in Moscow today that UN weapons inspectors will need a few months before they can wrap up their work in Iraq.

Blix- speech said in SC.


PART IV: Terrorism claims on:



An Iraqi diplomat in Nairobi has been accused of being linked to a Ugandan guerrilla group connected with Islamic fundamentalist organisations. Britain's Daily Telegraph newspaper claimed it had seen intelligence papers with "first hand vidence of ties between Iraq and religious terrorism." It claimed that Fallah Hassan Al Rubdie, while Iraq's charge d'affaires in Nairobi, held talks with the Allied Democratic Forces, (ADF) which it claimed was a Ugandan guerrilla group with ties to other anti-western Islamist organisations. The intelligence paper included a letter to the head of the Iraqi spy agency, in which a senior representative outlined his group's efforts to set up an "international mujahideen team."

Nation Reporter Nairobi-2002



Suspicion that Iraq was involved in the Sept. 11 attacks was fueled mainly by reports over the past year of a meeting in Prague in April 2001 between apparent hijacker Mohammed Atta (believed to have piloted the first plane that crashed into the World Trade Center a year ago) and Iraqi diplomat Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir el-Ani. A high Bush administration official was quoted in the August 2 Los Angles Times as saying evidence of the meeting "holds up." Czech officials have insisted the meeting took place. They subsequently expelled the Iraqi diplomat.

Wes Vernon, Monday, Sept. 9, 2002



Some Iraqi militants trained in Taliban-run Afghanistan helped Ansar al-Islam, an Islamist militia based in a lawless part of northeast Iraq. The camps of Ansar fighters, who clashed repeatedly with anti-Saddam Kurds, were bombed in the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell told the U.N. Security Council that Iraq was harboring a terrorist cell led by Abu Musab Zarqawi, a suspected al-Qaeda affiliate and chemical and biological weapons specialist. Powell said al-Zarqawi had both planned the October 2002 assassination of a U.S. diplomat in Jordan and set up a camp in Ansar al-Islam’s territory to train terrorists in the use of chemical weapons. Powell added that senior Iraqi and al-Qaeda leaders had met at least eight times since the early 1990s.

Czech officials have also reported that Muhammad Atta, one of the September 11 ringleaders, met an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague months before the hijackings, but U.S. and Czech officials subsequently cast doubt on whether such a meeting ever happened. Al-Qaeda members fleeing Afghanistan have reportedly hid in northern Iraq, but in areas beyond Saddam’s control.

Answer of CIA official to the question of WHAT EVEIDENCE DO YOU HAVE THAT IRAQ HAS TIES WITH TERRORISM?—2002


Philippine terrorists claim link to Iraq

CEBU, Philippines — Islamist terrorists in the southern Philippines who have killed two American hostages in recent years say they are receiving money from Iraqis close to President Saddam Hussein.

Hamsiraji Sali, a local commander of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf on the remote southern island of Basilan, says he is getting nearly $20,000 a year from supporters in Iraq.
"It's so we would have something to spend on chemicals for bomb-making and for the movement of our people," Sali told a reporter this week, renewing earlier claims of support from Iraq.

By Marc Lerner THE WASHINGTON TIMES March 4, 2003




PART V: Witnesses


· Witnesses to testify:

1. Iranian GA ambassador
2. Kuwaiti GA ambassador
3. Israeli GA ambassador


1. Iran:

Q. Has Iraq ever used chemical warfare against you in any war?
A. Yes, in over more than 40 occasions
Q. When this happened where you both signed to the Geneva protocol which prohibits the use of chemical warfare?
A. Yes
Q. Has Iraq embraced the UN resolutions, or has it defied the UN?
A. They have repeatedly defied most UN resolutions.
Q. Is the Arab region, and the world better off with these UN resolutions implemented on Iraq?
A.Iraq is a threat to all nations with its WMD, and it is much safer to just destroy its weapons.


2. Kuwait:

Q. Has Iraq ever shown signs of hostility, and signs of using WMD against Kuwait?
A. Yes, it has during the Gulf War, and has threatened to use WMD on Kuwait in the recent Gulf crisis.
Q. Will the Arab nations, and the world be safer with Iraq deprived of its WMD?
A. Yes, since it would not be able to threat any country, or attack any country with these means.
Q. Has Iraq defied any UN resolutions, and which in particular?
A. Iraq has defied more then one resolution prohibiting it from the use/production of WMD, specifically 687, 707, 715.


3. Israel:

Q. Have you ever bombed Iraq?
A. Yes
Q. Can you please state why you did this?
A. Because we were concerned about or safety, Iraq had been building a nuclear reactor at that time.
Q. What evidence do you have that proves they would have used them against you?
A. Iraq has threatened Israel on countless occasions, and is helping the Palestinians by giving them money for attacking us. Bombing us with WMD wouldn’t have been something they wouldn’t have done.
Q. Does Iraq still pose a threat to the Arab, and international community?
A. Yes, and this has been recently proven. Labs of chemical and biological weapons have been found, along side anthrax and chemical warheads from the Gulf War.
Q. Is Iraq now safer under the US authorization, and under a new lead other than Saddam?
A. Of course. The US authorities can now at least be bale to search Iraq freely for WMD, and the results of these searches have proven that it was a threat.




PART VI: Depositions:

· Deposition 1: Collin Powell’s speech against Iraq at SC:


Let’s review a few selected items of this conversation.

Two officers talking to each other on the radio want to make

sure that nothing is misunderstood:


"Remove. Remove."

The expression, the expression, "I got it."

"Nerve agents. Nerve agents. Wherever it comes up."

"Got it."

"Wherever it comes up."

"In the wireless instructions, in the instructions."

"Correction. No. In the wireless instructions."

"Wireless. I got it."

Why does he repeat it that way? Why is he so forceful in making sure this is understood? And why did he focus on wireless instructions? Because the senior officer is concerned that somebody might be listening. Well, somebody was.

"Nerve agents. Stop talking about it. They are listening to us. Don’t give any evidence that we have these horrible agents."

Well, we know that they do. And this kind of conversation confirms it. Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets.

Even the low end of 100 tons of agent would enable Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties across more than 100 square miles of territory, an area nearly 5 times the size of Manhattan. Let me remind you that, of the 122 millimeter chemical warheads, that the U.N. inspectors found recently, this discovery could very well be, as has been noted, the tip of the submerged iceberg. The question before us, all my friends, is when will we see the rest of the submerged iceberg?


Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again, against his neighbors and against his own people. And we have sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them. He wouldn’t be passing out the orders if he didn’t have the weapons or the intent to use them.

We also have sources who tell us that, since the 1980s, Saddam’s regime has been experimenting on human beings to perfect its biological or chemical weapons. A source said that 1,600 death row prisoners were transferred in 1995 to a special unit for such experiments. An eyewitness saw prisoners tied down to beds, experiments conducted on them, blood oozing around the victim’s mouths and autopsies performed to confirm the effects on the prisoners. Saddam Hussein’s humanity - inhumanity has no limits.


Let me turn now to nuclear weapons. We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, we have more than a decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons. To fully appreciate the challenge that we face today, remember that, in 1991, the inspectors searched Iraq’s primary nuclear weapons facilities for the first time. And they found nothing to conclude that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program.

But based on defector information in May of 1991, Saddam Hussein’s lie was exposed. In truth, Saddam Hussein had a massive clandestine nuclear weapons program that covered several different techniques to enrich uranium, including electromagnetic isotope separation, gas centrifuge, and gas diffusion. We estimate that this elicit program cost the Iraqis several billion dollars.Nonetheless, Iraq continued to tell the IAEA that it had no nuclear weapons program. If Saddam had not been stopped, Iraq could have produced a nuclear bomb by 1993, years earlier than most worse-case assessments that had been made before the war.

In 1995, as a result of another defector, we find out that, after his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein had initiated a crash program to build a crude nuclear weapon in violation of Iraq’s U.N. obligations.

Saddam Hussein already possesses two out of the three key components needed to build a nuclear bomb. He has a cadre of nuclear scientists with the expertise, and he has a bomb design. Since 1998, his efforts to reconstitute his nuclear program have been focused on acquiring the third and last component, sufficient fissile material to produce a nuclear explosion. To make the fissile material, he needs to develop an ability to enrich uranium.

Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb. He is so determined that he has made repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries, even after inspections resumed. These tubes are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group precisely because they can be used as centrifuges for enriching uranium. By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes, and we all know that there are differences of opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other experts, and the Iraqis themselves, argue that they are really to produce the rocket bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple rocket launcher.

Let me tell you what is not controversial about these tubes. First, all the experts who have analyzed the tubes in our possession agree that they can be adapted for centrifuge use. Second, Iraq had no business buying them for any purpose. They are banned for Iraq. I am no expert on centrifuge tubes, but just as an old Army trooper, I can tell you a couple of things: First, it strikes me as quite odd that these tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds U.S. requirements for comparable rockets. Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don’t think so.Second, we actually have examined tubes from several different batches that were seized clandestinely before they reached Baghdad. What we notice in these different batches is a progression to higher and higher levels of specification, including, in the latest batch, an anodized coating on extremely smooth inner and outer surfaces. Why would they continue refining the specifications, go to all that trouble for something that, if it was a rocket, would soon be blown into shrapnel when it went off?

The high tolerance aluminum tubes are only part of the story. We also have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is attempting to acquire magnets and high-speed balancing machines; both items can be used in a gas centrifuge program to enrich uranium. In 1999 and 2000, Iraqi officials negotiated with firms in Romania, India, Russia and Slovenia for the purchase of a magnet production plant. Iraq wanted the plant to produce magnets weighing 20 to 30 grams. That’s the same weight as the magnets used in Iraq’s gas centrifuge program before the Gulf War. This incident linked with the tubes is another indicator of Iraq’s attempt to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program.

Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last summer show that Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be used to balance gas centrifuge rotors. One of these companies also had been involved in a failed effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminum tubes into Iraq. People will continue to debate this issue, but there is no doubt in my mind, these elicit procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussein is very much focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons program, the ability to produce fissile material. He also has been busy trying to maintain the other key parts of his nuclear program, particularly his cadre of key nuclear scientists.

It is noteworthy that, over the last 18 months, Saddam Hussein has paid increasing personal attention to Iraqi’s top nuclear scientists, a group that the governmental-controlled press calls openly, his nuclear mujahedeen. He regularly exhorts them and praises their progress. Progress toward what end? Long ago, the Security Council, this council, required Iraq to halt all nuclear activities of any kind.


Let me talk now about the systems Iraq is developing to deliver weapons of mass destruction, in particular Iraq’s ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs. First, missiles. We all remember that before the Gulf War Saddam Hussein’s goal was missiles that flew not just hundreds, but thousands of kilometers. He wanted to strike not only his neighbors, but also nations far beyond his borders.

While inspectors destroyed most of the prohibited ballistic missiles, numerous intelligence reports over the past decade, from sources inside Iraq, indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of 650 to 900 kilometers.

We know from intelligence and Iraq’s own admissions that Iraq’s alleged permitted ballistic missiles, the al-Samud II (ph) and the al- Fatah (ph), violate the 150-kilometer limit established by this council in Resolution 687. These are prohibited systems.

UNMOVIC has also reported that Iraq has illegally important 380 SA-2 (ph) rocket engines. These are likely for use in the al-Samud II (ph). Their import was illegal on three counts. Resolution 687 prohibited all military shipments into Iraq. UNSCOM specifically prohibited use of these engines in surface-to-surface missiles. And finally, as we have just noted, they are for a system that exceeds the 150-kilometer range limit.

Worst of all, some of these engines were acquired as late as December - after this council passed Resolution 1441. What I want you to know today is that Iraq has programs that are intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly of 1,000 kilometers. One program is pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200 kilometers. And you can see from this map, as well as I can, who will be in danger of these missiles.

As part of this effort, another little piece of evidence, Iraq has built an engine test stand that is larger than anything it has ever had. Notice the dramatic difference in size between the test stand on the left, the old one, and the new one on the right. Note the large exhaust vent. This is where the flame from the engine comes out. The exhaust on the right test stand is five times longer than the one on the left. The one on the left was used for short-range missile. The one on the right is clearly intended for long-range missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometers. This photograph was taken in April of 2002.

Since then, the test stand has been finished and a roof has been put over it so it will be harder for satellites to see what’s going on underneath the test stand.

Saddam Hussein’s intentions have never changed. He is not developing the missiles for self-defense. These are missiles that Iraq wants in order to project power, to threaten, and to deliver chemical, biological and, if we let him, nuclear warheads.

Now, unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs. Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for more than a decade. This is just illustrative of what a UAV would look like. This effort has included attempts to modify for unmanned flight the MiG-21 (ph) and with greater success an aircraft called the L-29 (ph). However, Iraq is now concentrating not on these airplanes, but on developing and testing smaller UAVs, such as this.

UAVs are well suited for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs. And of the little that Saddam Hussein told us about UAVs, he has not told the truth. One of these lies is graphically and indisputably demonstrated by intelligence we collected on June 27, last year. According to Iraq’s December 7 declaration, its UAVs have a range of only 80 kilometers. But we detected one of Iraq’s newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the race track pattern depicted here. Not only is this test well in excess of the 150 kilometers that the United Nations permits, the test was left out of Iraq’s December 7th declaration. The UAV was flown around and around and around in a circle. And so, that its 80 kilometer limit really was 500 kilometers unrefueled and on autopilot, violative of all of its obligations under 1441.

The linkages over the past 10 years between Iraq’s UAV program and biological and chemical warfare agents are of deep concern to us. Iraq could use these small UAVs which have a wingspan of only a few meters to deliver biological agents to its neighbors or if transported, to other countries, including the United States.


My friends, the information I have presented to you about these terrible weapons and about Iraq’s continued flaunting of its obligations under Security Council Resolution 1441 links to a subject I now want to spend a little bit of time on. And that has to do with terrorism. Our concern is not just about these elicit weapons. It’s the way that these elicit weapons can be connected to terrorists and terrorist organizations that have no compunction about using such devices against innocent people around the world.

Iraq and terrorism go back decades. Baghdad trains Palestine Liberation Front members in small arms and explosives. Saddam uses the Arab Liberation Front to funnel money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers in order to prolong the Intifada. And it’s no secret that Saddam’s own intelligence service was involved in dozens of attacks or attempted assassinations in the 1990s.

But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, an associated in collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaida lieutenants. Zarqawi, a Palestinian born in Jordan, fought in the Afghan war more than a decade ago. Returning to Afghanistan in 2000, he oversaw a terrorist training camp. One of his specialities and one of the specialties of this camp is poisons. When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zarqaqi network helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp. And this camp is located in northeastern Iraq.

Going back to the early and mid-1990s, when bin Laden was based in Sudan, an Al Qaida source tells us that Saddam and bin Laden reached an understanding that Al Qaida would no longer support activities against Baghdad. Early Al Qaida ties were forged by secret, high-level intelligence service contacts with Al Qaida, secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with Al Qaida.

We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign security service tells us, that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum, and later met the director of the Iraqi intelligence service.

Saddam became more interested as he saw Al Qaida’s appalling attacks. A detained Al Qaida member tells us that Saddam was more willing to assist Al Qaida after the 1998 bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Saddam was also impressed by Al Qaida’s attacks on the USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000.

Iraqis continued to visit bin Laden in his new home in Afghanistan. A senior defector, one of Saddam’s former intelligence chiefs in Europe, says Saddam sent his agents to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s to provide training to Al Qaida members on document forgery. From the late 1990s until 2001, the Iraqi embassy in Pakistan played the role of liaison to the Al Qaida organization.

Some believe, some claim these contacts do not amount to much. They say Saddam Hussein’s secular tyranny and Al Qaida’s religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and Al Qaida together, enough so Al Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that Al Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction.

And the record of Saddam Hussein’s cooperation with other Islamist terrorist organizations is clear. Hamas, for example, opened an office in Baghdad in 1999, and Iraq has hosted conferences attended by Palestine Islamic Jihad. These groups are at the forefront of sponsoring suicide attacks against Israel.

Al Qaida continues to have a deep interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. As with the story of Zarqawi and his network, I can trace the story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq provided training in these weapons to Al Qaida. Fortunately, this operative is now detained, and he has told his story. I will relate it to you now as he, himself, described it. This senior Al Qaida terrorist was responsible for one of Al Qaida’s training camps in Afghanistan.

His information comes first-hand from his personal involvement at senior levels of Al Qaida. He says bin Laden and his top deputy in Afghanistan, deceased Al Qaida leader Muhammad Atif (ph), did not believe that Al Qaida labs in Afghanistan were capable enough to manufacture these chemical or biological agents. They needed to go somewhere else. They had to look outside of Afghanistan for help. Where did they go? Where did they look? They went to Iraq.

The support that (inaudible) describes included Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training for two Al Qaida associates beginning in December 2000. He says that a militant known as Abu Abdula Al-Iraqi (ph) had been sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring poisons and gases. Abdula Al-Iraqi (ph) characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful.

As I said at the outset, none of this should come as a surprise to any of us. Terrorism has been a tool used by Saddam for decades. Saddam was a supporter of terrorism long before these terrorist networks had a name. And this support continues. The nexus of poisons and terror is new. The nexus of Iraq and terror is old. The combination is lethal. With this track record, Iraqi denials of supporting terrorism take the place alongside the other Iraqi denials of weapons of mass destruction. It is all a web of lies.

When we confront a regime that harbors ambitions for regional domination, hides weapons of mass destruction and provides haven and active support for terrorists, we are not confronting the past, we are confronting the present. And unless we act, we are confronting an even more frightening future.


My friends, this has been a long and a detailed presentation. And I thank you for your patience. But there is one more subject that I would like to touch on briefly. And it should be a subject of deep and continuing concern to this council, Saddam Hussein’s violations of human rights.

Underlying all that I have said, underlying all the facts and the patterns of behavior that I have identified as Saddam Hussein’s contempt for the will of this council, his contempt for the truth and most damning of all, his utter contempt for human life. Saddam Hussein’s use of mustard and nerve gas against the Kurds in 1988 was one of the 20th century’s most horrible atrocities; 5,000 men, women and children died.

His campaign against the Kurds from 1987 to ’89 included mass summary executions, disappearances, arbitrary jailing, ethnic cleansing and the destruction of some 2,000 villages. He has also conducted ethnic cleansing against the Shi’a Iraqis and the Marsh Arabs whose culture has flourished for more than a millennium. Saddam Hussein’s police state ruthlessly eliminates anyone who dares to dissent.

Iraq has more forced disappearance cases than any other country, tens of thousands of people reported missing in the past decade.

Nothing points more clearly to Saddam Hussein’s dangerous intentions and the threat he poses to all of us than his calculated cruelty to his own citizens and to his neighbors. Clearly, Saddam Hussein and his regime will stop at nothing until something stops him.

For more than 20 years, by word and by deed Saddam Hussein has pursued his ambition to dominate Iraq and the broader Middle East using the only means he knows, intimidation, coercion and annihilation of all those who might stand in his way. For Saddam Hussein, possession of the world’s most deadly weapons is the ultimate trump card, the one he most hold to fulfill his ambition.

We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction; he’s determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein’s history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not some day use these weapons at a time and the place and in the manner of his choosing at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond?

The United States will not and cannot run that risk to the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world.

My colleagues, over three months ago this council recognized that Iraq continued to pose a threat to international peace and security, and that Iraq had been and remained in material breach of its disarmament obligations. Today Iraq still poses a threat and Iraq still remains in material breach. Indeed, by its failure to seize on its one last opportunity to come clean and disarm, Iraq has put itself in deeper material breach and closer to the day when it will face serious consequences for its continued defiance of this council.

My colleagues, we have an obligation to our citizens, we have an obligation to this body to see that our resolutions are complied with. We wrote 1441 not in order to go to war, we wrote 1441 to try to preserve the peace. We wrote 1441 to give Iraq one last chance. Iraq is not so far taking that one last chance.

We must not shrink from whatever is ahead of us. We must not fail in our duty and our responsibility to the citizens of the countries that are represented by this body.

Thank you, Mr. President.




PART VII: Pictured evidence:


Weapons of mass destruction


The connection to terrorism





Memorial: The United States


Statements of Facts:

1. Although Iraq has been warned not to use/make any weapons of mass destruction, in many treaties, it has violated both of these rules.

2. Iraq has used chemical weapons before against Iran (13th March 1984), and also against the Kurds in northern Iraq (18th March 1988).

3. Iraq has been accused of more than 50 accusations of using chemical warfare against Iran only, killing almost 2309 people by poison gas.

4. Iraq has tried to produce nuclear warfare before, and still possesses all what is required to produce one.

5. Although Iraq was asked to cooperate with weapons inspectors in a UN resolution, it failed to do so.

6. Iraq has offered aid, and supported terrorist groups in economic, ans military ways.

7. Iraq has been linked to many terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda, and similar groups in Nigeria.

Legal Claims:

Both Iran (1929) and Iraq (1931) are parties to the Geneva ProtocoI, which prohibits the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, as well as the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. Also The UN Security Council has issued a statement condemning the use of chemical weapons during the Gulf War. It remains uncertain whether the sources of supply were indigenous or external. Export controls have been placed on certain chemicals that could be used in the production of mustard and nerve gases.

Also, as of 2002-2003 the UN has asked Iraq to cooperate with weapons inspectors on countless occasions, and it has not only been uncooperative, but hid all of its restricted warfare, so as the inspectors don’t find them. Some resolutions that asked Iraq to cooperate, ans stop making these weapons are numbered 707, and 687 both are UN-SC resolutions.

All this states that Iraq has been THREATENED WITH severe consequences for using such inhumane methods of attack, and yet they still produce chemical weapons, and biological weapons, and have plans to posses nuclear weapons.

Judgment Requested:

Since the United States sees Iraq, as the whole world sees it, a terrorist country, that terrorizes its neighbors with weapons of mass destruction, the United States believes that the court should:

1. Allow the United States to run Iraq until all weapon-related accusations are cleared.

2. Allow a United States search team to look for weapons of mass destruction, or anything associated with them, and when found to be destroyed by this team.

3. Put certain sanctions on the imports, and exports of any chemicals that can be used to produce any sort of weapons of mass destruction (such as anthrax).

4. ORDER Iraq to share all its information with the United Nations about weapon-production when the new Iraqi government is put into action.

5. Pay fines for the damage, and chaos it caused while ignorantly ignoring the UN resolutions, and defying them.

6. All Iraqi weaopons scientists should be captured, ans imprisoned because of their alleged helpings in defying the UN.

7. Anybody linked to any terrosrist group, if found, will be handed to the United States for trail, and anybody who is found guilty will get the death penalty.

8. Give permition to the United States to form a similar group as the CIA located in Iraq to track down terrorist, and terrorists-linked people.